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Marginalized Groups in PNPM-Rural
About the report
Th e Marginalized and Vulnerable Groups Study grew out of a concern that the marginalized 
segments of society were being left out of the development planning process in the National Program 
for Community Empowerment1 in Rural Areas (PNPM-Rural)—a nation-wide community 
driven development project in Indonesia. Previous studies on the Kecamatan Development Project 
(KDP), the predecessor of PNPM-Rural, as well as the baseline survey for PNPM-Rural indicated 
that decision-making within the project favored the majority and better-off  as opposed to poorer 
villagers and those living in outlying areas. (See McLaughlin, et. al., 2007; Voss, 2008) Poorer 
groups, which include female heads-of-households and heads-of-household with no primary 
education, have limited participation in the KDP/PNPM-Rural decision making process, as about 
75 percent of the poor attending the meetings were passive participants (Gibson and Woolcock, 
2005; Voss, 2008). Other studies have shown that despite the passive nature of participation, when 
compared to similar projects, KDP/PNPM-Rural was better in getting the poor involved (Agung 
1 Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri-Pedesaan
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and Hull, 2002). Th is study was undertaken to better understand the dynamics of participation, 
defi ned as “a process through which stakeholders infl uence and share control over development 
initiatives, decisions and resources which aff ect them.”2
Objective of the study
Th is study attempts to answer the following questions:
 Who participates in PNPM-Rural and who does not?
 Why do these groups not participate? What are the obstacles to participation?
 What can be improved in poverty programs, such as PNPM-Rural or other targeted programs, 
to reach these groups?
We examine the socio-economic and political reasons why some groups participate in the 
development process and others are marginalized.
Methodology
Th is study used qualitative methodology to answer the research questions. Apart from a review of 
related documents, data was collected mostly through key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions. Cross interviews, especially with (but not limited to) informants of diff erent positions, 
socio-economic background, and (presumed) interests were used to verify answers.
Fieldwork was done in 24 villages in 12 sub-districts (kecamatan) in six provinces (West Sumatra, 
West Java, West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Papua) from October to 
December 2009. Within each sub-district, research sites were selected as follows: one randomly 
selected village and the village considered poorest.
2 Agung, I., & Hull, T. (2002). Study on the Economic Loan Scheme. Accessed September 7, 2009, from http://www.
ppk.or.id/downloads/Study%20on%20the%20Economic%20Loan%20Scheme.pdf
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Main ﬁ ndings
1. On Participation and Socio-Economic Structure
Corroborating previous studies, this study fi nds that marginalized groups have limited 
participation in the decision making process in PNPM-Rural when compared to other groups 
in the village. Dissecting the socio-economic structure reveals some insight to the dynamics of 
participation in decision-making within PNPM-Rural.
Community groupings are not neatly confi ned within economic status as the term “marginalized” 
implies (although marginalized people are mostly poor/very poor). Th ey can cross or overlap 
economic groups. In relation to PNPM-Rural participation (or non-participation), generally there 
are four major groups: the elite, the activists, the majority, and marginalized groups. Th e elite are 
the wealthy, village government leaders, religious and customary leaders, while the activists are 
villagers who posses knowledge of government projects and use this knowledge to get involved. 
Th ese activists, such as those in farmers’ groups and PKK (government-led women’s group), have a 
close relationship with government leaders. Th e majority of the village population are people with 
few assets or small income levels, such as small landowners, ojeg drivers (motorcycle taxi drivers), 
small industry workers and mobile vendors. Th e marginalized groups can be characterized as 
having no (valuable) assets, living in outlying areas with limited basic infrastructure, having limited 
income with a large number of dependents, and originating from an ethnic/religious minority.
Of the elite, the village offi  cials have most infl uence over the decision making in PNPM-
Rural. Th ey work together with the activists, who participate actively in village meetings and 
in Program implementation. Th ey can manipulate or intervene in PNPM-Rural processes when 
it suits their interests. Contrary to common perception, the wealthy are not interested in becoming 
involved in development programs, unless there are specifi c projects that would benefi t them. 
Customary leaders are not that involved either, except the ninik mamak in West Sumatra and the 
clan leaders in Papua. Religious leaders were not interested in being involved, except in West Java. 
Th e majority is more informed about PNPM-Rural than the marginalized group, but they are not 
actively involved in village discussions, and hence have little infl uence on decisions, unless they 
have close relations with the village leaders or customary leaders. Th e marginalized group is the 
least involved, except as construction laborers, and has little information on the Program. Th eir 
voice may be heard if they happen to have a personal relationship with the activists and offi  cials.
Special meetings for women to agree on “women’s proposals”, including savings and loans, 
increase women’s participation but decisions are still limited to the elite and activists. Th e 
participants are usually the prospective borrowers for the savings and loans component of PNPM-
Rural. Th ese are women who have regular income (e.g., teachers, traders) and are thought to be 
able to repay their loans. Very few women from marginalized groups are invited to participate.  
Despite limited participation, marginalized groups enjoy the benefi ts of the PNPM-Rural, 
albeit not as much as the other groups. In the case of PNPM-Rural infrastructure projects, the 
majority of the population benefi ts although the project might not be their preference. Many 
members of marginalized groups also work as construction laborers on these sub-projects.
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2. On Obstacles to Participation
Facilitation, which is expected to circumvent the elite dominance, is weak. Kecamatan 
Facilitators (FKs) are loaded with administrative work and focus more on project procedures than 
facilitating and enabling diff erent groups, particularly marginalized groups. With village facilitators 
(KPMDs) being trained by FKs, the focus on facilitation is further reduced. Given their workload 
and capacity, FKs are unable to assist and supervise adequately the 10-20 KPMDs who work under 
them. Facilitation requires building personal relationships and developing trust, which needs time 
to deepen or advance gradually over time. Most facilitators do not have the skills (or the awareness) 
to undertake this kind of facilitation.
Th e PNPM-Rural process has become routine and does not inspire participation. Facilitation 
for empowerment is not a quick fi x that can be done by a repeated, mechanistic process year 
in/year out—it bores many villagers who get involved. Th e long process and “laddering up” 
discussions (from hamlet to inter-village) lead to decreasing levels of participation. Low skill-levels 
of all facilitators, high turnover of FKs in some locations, and elite intervention all contribute to 
decreased levels of enthusiasm and low expectations.
Project design and institutions did not keep pace with the PNPM-Rural scale-up. PNPM-
Rural has scaled up from 26 villages in the pilot project (1997) to 61,000 villages(2010), with 
a sharp increase in locations coming in 2009 when the project scaled-up from 2,629 to 4,290 
kecamatan. PNPM-Rural’s design and implementing institutions did not adjust adequately. 
To keep up with the scale-up, implementation became increasingly focused on administration. 
Th e PNPM-Rural  process has become mechanical, leaving behind the kind of facilitation that 
empowers communities. Monitoring and evaluation followed suit; PNPM-Rural is not able to 
monitor the quality of participation, beyond quantitative assessment. Project monitoring is spread 
across too many areas; a better policy would be to focus on certain issues deemed important to the 
Program (i.e. quality of participation).
Delays in disbursement are also attributable to institutional capacity. When delays in 
disbursement occur in a nation-wide project, the impact is substantial. It appears that the 
institutional capacity is not present to support PNPM-Rural. In almost every village visited for 
this study the delays in disbursement, especially the operational funds that come from the local 
government, lead to short cuts in the process. Th is creates frustration among project actors and 
villagers. In some cases, when money does not come on time (e.g., loans for planting), the funds 
are used for purposes other than those for which they were originally intended. 
Recommendations
Community empowerment does not usually operate on a large scale due to the intensive facilitation 
required. A large-scale project requires a specifi c focus and practical objectives, and therefore tends 
be mechanical.3 We recommend that PNPM-Rural be redesigned to focus on a single area to be 
3 PNPM-Rural covers 61,000 villages in Indonesia in more than 4,000 sub-districts.  More than 10,000 Kecamatan 
Facilitators (FKs) had to be recruited (half of them are engineers). Th ey train and supervise 10-20 village facilitators 
in each sub-district.
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more eff ective. Within PNPM-Rural there are a number of pilot programs, for example PNPM 
Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas, PNPM Green—these pilots could provide the means to refocus the 
Program.4 Given marginalized groups’ poor levels of participation, the question of increasing the 
number of activities moving through PNPM-Rural Inti should be carefully considered. PNPM-
Rural Inti has worked most eff ectively with infrastructure. Increased numbers of dedicated 
facilitators are needed to more eff ectively facilitate marginalized groups and on savings and loans 
or they should be developed gradually through pilot activities of PNPM-Rural. Th e followings will 
discuss the proposed solutions for PNPM-Rural in more details.
1. Selecting a single focus
Capitalize on PNPM-Rural’s strength by focusing only on community infrastructure, which 
is what PNPM-Rural has done best.  Although infrastructure does not yet proportionally benefi t 
marginalized groups (and probably never will), the study found that PNPM-Rural has been able to 
provide the needed public goods that benefi t marginalized groups. In some villages, especially the 
isolated areas, PNPM-Rural has been the only program that responded to the villagers’ requests. 
Involvement (in a broader sense) of marginalized groups is also relatively higher than in the 
savings and loan activities, at least as laborers in the construction work. Quality of infrastructure 
has been known to be generally good and relatively cheaper than those being built by regular 
contractors, as previous studies of KDP have shown. Providing better access through infrastructure 
is a “trademark” of PNPM-Rural and it is by all means not less important than providing small 
loans. Hence, the study recommends that the main PNPM-Rural (or PNPM-Rural Inti) only 
focus on providing infrastructure. Th e single focus would help ease the burden of facilitation 
and still bring signifi cant benefi ts. Other activities should be done selectively as PNPM-Rural 
Penguatan (see 4.2 and 4.3 below).
4 Literally PNPM-Rural Inti means “main” PNPM-Rural while PNPM-Rural Penguatan means “strengthening” 
PNPM-Rural. PNPM-Rural Penguatan is a “refi  ned off  spring” of PNPM-Rural that has been developed to focus on 
a specifi  c group or issue that needs additional inputs, including special grant money. Th  ese PNPM-Rural Penguatan 
are Green KDP (working on environmental issues), PEKKA (working with female household heads), PNPM-Rural 
Generasi (working on health and education), and SADI (on agriculture). PEKKA, in particular, has shown that 
strong facilitation has enabled female heads-of-households as a “marginalized group” to improve their position in the 
community and, for many, improve their livelihood.
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Simplify the PNPM-Rural mechanism without compromising public participation through 
plebiscites. Kecamatan and village facilitators are not well prepared for the kind of intensive and 
skilled facilitation that would enable marginalized groups to participate in a more substantial 
manner, i.e. in decision-making. In fact, fi nding or producing thousands of good facilitators is 
an enormous challenge.5 In addition, many villagers confess to being exhausted by the numerous 
meetings. Also, laddering the discussions from the hamlets up to the sub-districts did not provide 
more opportunities for participation. By the time the discussion reaches the sub-district, very often 
the voice of the people in the hamlets may have evaporated. Th e Program requires a much simpler 
mechanism. Th e study recommends that selection of village proposals are made through a 
plebiscite instead of deliberations. Th is mechanism was tried out in PNPM-Rural villages several 
years back. Th is experiment shows that selection of proposals is similar to those being selected by 
deliberations, with women’s proposals are more likely to be selected. Satisfaction is also rated higher 
when proposals are selected through direct votes.6
To off set the bias of hamlets with large populations, proposals should be weighted. A simple 
scoring system can be made using two criteria: population size of hamlet and distance of the 
proposed project site to village center. Proposals from hamlets with small population weigh more 
and so do project sites that are further away from the village center.
2. Tending marginalized groups
Facilitation of marginalized groups should organize them and enable them to voice their 
needs. By defi nition marginalized groups lack resources, access to information, and confi dence—
hence, they are the groups that need special support through PNPM-Rural to ensure that their 
voice is properly heard and not merely represented by elites. However, unlike the other PNPM-
Rural programs, we recommend that there is no special grant awarded to these groups. Th ese 
groups are not intended to be exclusive nor should they become a “special” group with its own 
funds that might alienate them from the rest of the villagers. Th e main objective of the special 
facilitation is to strengthen the groups and enable them to participate more actively in decision 
making in village activities, including PNPM-Rural and its SPP.  Specifi cally, for “leveling the 
playing fi eld”, the facilitation should aim to develop the marginalized groups’ organizing capacity, 
negotiation skills, networking, and access to information to enable them to voice their needs and 
demand some response. Th is kind of empowerment would need at least two-three years to develop. 
Members of the groups should be targeted to the bottom 10 percent of the village population. 
For the fi rst phase, pilot activities can be done in a few districts that have shown some degree of 
organizing capacity. 
5 After the completion of fi eldwork we understand that PNPM-Rural management is undertaking substantial changes, 
in particular in reducing the workload of facilitators to let them have more time for facilitation. Facilitators need only 
to provide reports to the Kabupaten. Th ey do not have to train the village facilitators—professional trainers will do 
the work. Village proposals that have been verifi ed but not funded will be automatically funded in the following year. 
Other changes include training methods for facilitators that allow more refl ection and groups’ discussions. Results 
of these changes are not yet observed. (Interview with Bapak Bito Wikantosa of PNPM-Rural Secretariat, April 29, 
2010). 
6 See Olken, Ben (2008). “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in 
Indonesia.” NBER Working Paper No. 14123.
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3. Facilitating more sustainable savings and loans
Focus only where savings and loans work and provide specifi c facilitation. Th ere is generally no 
lack of demand for loans in the study sites, but only in a few cases groups are able to improve their 
livelihood through the loans. Findings of the study show that in most places SPP does not work as 
expected. Groups are recently formed and specifi cally for the purpose of getting the PNPM-Rural 
loans. Many members, particularly the poor who are included to meet PNPM-Rural requirements, 
do not have a clear idea what kind of income-generating activities they will undertake with the 
loan. Th eir businesses are often not viable. Even if they have good business plan, there are rarely 
any supporting activities or trainings that strengthen the group—as a borrower—and help it deal 
with problems the members face, e.g., in marketing and getting materials in bulk for lower prices. 
In a few cases, SPP does help marginalized groups improve their livelihoods, such as in a hamlet 
in South Sulawesi where the group leader is very committed in helping poor women. In general, 
however, the current model appears to put SPP as an “appendix” to PNPM-Rural; there is relatively 
little focus on supporting the groups other than book checking. Furthermore, it is not sustainable as 
repayment rates remain low (see Chapter 2). Clearly small credit groups under PNPM-Rural need 
specifi c facilitation, too, since their needs are diff erent from the general facilitation PNPM-Rural 
provides so far. Facilitation is needed to strengthen the SPP groups and examine the problems the 
group faces, including in running their business(es). Treatment would be diff erent when groups 
consist of members with individual business than those with group business. Obviously, such 
intensive assistance cannot be provided on a large scale. We recommend that SPP is turned into 
PNPM-Rural Penguatan, too, and given only to selected areas that have demonstrated success 
(i.e., good repayment rates).
4. Institutional and technical improvements
Th e scaled-up PNPM-Rural now requires diff erent handling, institutionally and technically. Below 
are some recommendations to improve the operations of PNPM-Rural, bearing in mind that the 
technical improvements will not signifi cantly encourage participation of the marginalized group.
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 Facilitation school for facilitators. One of the most consistent fi ndings in the study is that 
FKs and KPMDs lack the awareness and facilitation skills to work with marginalized groups. 
KPMDs’ low quality of facilitation skills is an output of weak FKs, who train the village 
facilitators. Th e new training school that PNPM-Rural currently developing is the right step 
to increase and improve the pool of qualifi ed facilitators. At a later point it will be necessary 
to evaluate whether the school actually increases the competency of the facilitators.
 Training and operational costs for KPMD from UPK. Th e FK must be well qualifi ed, 
including being capable of training the KPMD. Th e recent idea to release the FK from training 
the KPMD and delegate the work to professional trainers is positive.7 However, good training 
by itself is not enough. In the case of KPMD, the operational costs have become a major 
stumbling block to enable KPMD to visit all hamlets, especially isolated areas that usually are 
the farthest from the village center. Even if the work of the KPMD is intended to be partially 
voluntary (the wages they receive are small), it is hardly viable for most KPMD to pay for the 
gas (and a few of them have motorcycles) or other transportation. Th ese operational costs can 
be paid by the proceeds of the UPK.
 Focus on key participation issues to monitor and provide feedback. For a program as large 
as PNPM-Rural it is hardly possible to monitor everything in detail. Hence, PNPM needs 
to identify priority areas and see that these areas are reported in suffi  cient detail to enable 
PNPM-Rural to receive useful feedback that can inform the evaluation of program design 
and implementation. To understand participation, for example, it is not enough to report 
how many people—men and women, poor and non-poor—attend a meeting, but also who 
speaks and infl uences the decision made. Th e FK should be responsible for ensuring that 
the KPMD’s work is up to standard, including reporting. Most importantly, the Kabupaten 
Facilitators should make periodic spot checks of what has been reported (e.g., the attendance 
list) and report the results. Finally, reports from the fi eld must receive responses: this sends the 
message that the reports matter.
 Use independent monitoring groups. Regular monitoring by the Government, World Bank 
and others should be complemented by an independent monitoring group, particularly to 
provide a more ongoing, qualitative evaluation of the PNPM-Rural process. PNPM-Rural 
has been using provincial non-government organizations to do this work for quite a few years, 
but the quality varies. PNPM-Rural should review the work and select one or two of the best 
groups to work with a few others to improve the quality of the monitoring.
 Reduce delays in disbursements to the fi eld. Delays in disbursements indicate issues 
with institutional preparedness that extends well beyond the PNPM-Rural program. Th e 
delays also indicate that PNPM-Rural has always been viewed as a project rather than a 
program by the implementing agency; hence the implementing agency has never adapted to 
provide consistent, long-term support. As delays have aff ected the quality of PNPM-Rural 
implementation signifi cantly, serious eff orts have to be made to minimize these problems.
7  Interview with Bito Wikantosa of PNPM-Rural Secretariat, April 29, 2010.
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Introduction
1.1 A Brief History of PNPM-Rural 
In 2007, the Government of Indonesia launched a nation-wide poverty program called Program 
Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat-Mandiri (National Program for Community Empowerment 
or PNPM). Th e goals of this program are to reduce poverty, strengthen local government and 
community institutions, and improve local governance. PNPM grew out of two earlier community 
development programs, the Kecamatan Development Program and the Urban Poverty Program. 
Th ese programs facilitate a community planning and decision-making process leading to block 
grants to fund communities’ self-prioritized needs.
PNPM-Rural, or PNPM-Mandiri Pedesaan, originated from the Kecamatan Development Project 
(KDP), a three-year project fi nanced by a loan from the World Bank at the beginning of the major 
economic crisis of 1998. Although the design started before the crisis, adjustments were made 
when the crisis came. At that time the main purpose was to channel money quickly to villages, 
covering over 500 sub-districts (kecamatan) in selected provinces and districts. As a project it was 
Photo by Akatiga
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intended to be short—three years. Kecamatan Facilitators (FKs) were required to have at least three 
years of experience in facilitation. Many came from non-governmental organizations that worked 
at the grassroots level. Given their past experience, training focused largely on the mechanism of 
the Project—they received relatively little training on facilitation.  
KDP turned out to be popular with many villagers. At a time when the government was centralized 
in Jakarta and the provincial and district governments had little autonomy, unsurprisingly proposals 
from villagers to address their everyday problems did not receive an adequate response. It was not 
unusual for villages to propose the same project for more than twenty years and never receive it. 
KDP provided the money, let villagers propose, and about a year later, the proposals were realized. 
In confl ict areas like South Maluku and Aceh, a confl ict resolution element was added in KDP. 
Th ere are two elements of PNPM: the Core PNPM (PNPM Inti) and Supporting PNPM (PNPM 
Penguatan). Th e Core PNPM is regionally based community empowerment activities, consists 
of PNPM-Rural, PNPM-Urban, PNPM for Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA), PNPM for Rural 
Infrastructure, and PNPM for Regional Socio-Economic Infrastructures. Th e Supporting PNPM 
are “...sector-based, region-based, and special economic empowerment” programs designed to 
support poverty reduction related to the achievement of specifi c goals PNPM: A Healthy and 
Bright Generation (PNPM Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas/ PNPM Generasi), Green PNPM (PNPM 
Hijau), and PNPM Smallholder Agribusiness Development Initiative (SADI)” (Th e Oversight 
Team of PNPM-Rural, n.a).
Specifi cally in Papua, PNPM has collaborated with the RESPEK program since 2008, forming 
PNPM RESPEK. RESPEK (Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung) is a village development 
program initiated by the provincial governments of Papua and West Papua in 2007 in order to 
spur village development in the fi ve priority areas: (i) nutrition; (ii) basic education; (iii) primary 
healthcare; (iv) village infrastructure; and (v) community livelihoods. Th e program channels block 
grants of 100 million Rupiah to each village in the two provinces, drawn from each province’s 
Special Autonomy funds. PNPM RESPEK is unique in that the disbursement of community block 
grant in Papua is not limited to one fi scal year (World Bank) because the community participatory 
planning process is slower than other provinces in Indonesia (due to geographical reasons).
1.1.1 Objectives of PNPM-Rural 
Th e overall objective of PNPM-Rural is to reduce poverty and improve local-level governance 
in rural areas of Indonesia through the provision of investment resources to support productive 
proposals developed by communities, using a participatory planning process. Th e community is 
allocated Community Block Grants (BLM or Bantuan Langsung Masyarakat). Each kecamatan is 
allocated from 1–3 billion Rupiah per year. Th e project is “open menu” meaning that the selection 
of activities is open, except for items specifi cally excluded through the project’s negative list. 
Key principles of PNPM-Rural are participation and inclusion (especially among the poor and 
women) through local decision-making by all villagers; transparency; open menu (except for a 
short negative list); competition for funds; decentralized decision-making and management, and 
as simple a mechanism as possible.  (World Bank , 2010) 
Th e assumption behind the project is that the selection of infrastructure will be the most eff ective 
way to promote village’s economic and job creation, while the competitive and musyawarah 
mechanism will lead to sustained democratization and community empowerment. 
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1.1.2 Institutional Structure of PNPM-Rural 
Administration of PNPM-Rural is conducted by the Directorate General of Community 
Empowerment in the Department of Home Aff airs. Th is department, together with the National 
Development Planning Agency or Bappenas (which focuses on monitoring, evaluation, and 
preparation of the project) and Department of Finance (which focuses on fund disbursement) 
form a steering committee that holds the highest level of decision-making process in PNPM-Rural 
policy.
At the provincial and Kabupaten level, Regional Development Planning Agencies (Bappeda) and 
local governments coordinate PNPM-Rural at provincial and regional level, whose function is to 
monitor PNPM-Rural’s progress.  Th ere are consultants at the national, provincial, and Kabupaten 
levels. 
Th e BLM fund is transferred to the community, and will be used to fund proposals based on 
community identifi ed needs and desired assistance. 
1.1.3 Activities of PNPM-Rural 
Th e PNPM-Rural project cycle includes information dissemination and socialization, preparation, 
participatory planning, implementation of activity, control, complaints and problem handling and 
management, evaluation, and reporting. 
To increase community participation in PNPM-Rural, there are several stages in a project cycle: 
1. Information dissemination and socialization through workshops with local government, 
hearings with parliament members in every level, and meetings/forums in the community
2. Participatory planning process. Th is stage includes meetings at the hamlet or sub-village, 
village, and kecamatan levels. Th e community selects Kader Pemberdayaan Masyarakat 
Desa (KPMD–village facilitator) to facilitate the socialization and planning process. 
Photo by Akatiga
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KPMDs conduct meetings with diff erent groups in the community, including the special 
meeting for women. PNPM-Rural provides two facilitators at the kecamatan level, one 
empowerment facilitator and technical facilitator, to assist communities with socialization, 
planning, and implementation.
3. Project selection at the village and kecamatan level. Th e village community conducts 
meetings (musyawarah) at the village level (to select proposals) and inter-village (kecamatan) 
level to rank projects for funding. Th e meetings are open for every community member.
4. Implementation. Th e community selects representatives to serve on the Implementation 
Management Committee (Tim Pengelola Kegiatan or TPK).  Th e kecamatan technical 
facilitator will provide assistance to TPK in designing selected infrastructure project, 
budgeting, quality verifi cation, and supervision. Workers on infrastructure projects come 
from the local community.
5. Accountability and Progress Report. Twice in every year, the TPK will report the progress 
to a community meeting. (PNPM-Mandiri Perdesaan, 2010) 
1.1.4 Participation: Review of Previous Studies 
Previous studies on KDP have shown that decision-making processes in PNPM-Rural provides 
benefi ts to the community, but there are groups that are not involved in the process. Th ese groups 
include poor groups and those who live in isolated area in a village. Decision-making process often 
benefi ts the wealthy or majority. Voss (2008), Gibson and Woolcock (2005) emphasize the low 
quality of participation in PNPM-Rural meetings, especially for poor groups. Levels of passive 
participation (meaning attending meetings, but not speaking) is 75 percent (Voss 2008), although 
earlier studies found that participation of poor group and women are better in KDP than in other 
similar programs. (Agung & Hull, 2002) 
1.2 Objectives of Study 
Considering the low levels of participation and the quality of participation, this study was designed 
to understand better the participation dynamics in PNPM-Rural, especially those who do not yet 
participate in the Program. Th is study answers the following research questions:
a. Who participates in PNPM-Rural and who does not?
b. Why do these groups not participate? What are the obstacles to participation?
c. What can be improved in poverty programs such as PNPM-Rural or other targeted 
programs to reach these groups?
Th is research will examine the socio-economic and political reasons why some groups do participate 
in the development process and others are marginalized.
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1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Study Framework 
Participation in this study is defi ned as “…a process through which stakeholders infl uence and share 
control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which aff ect them…”(Th e World 
Bank, 1994, in Rietbergen, McCracken, & Narayan, 1998, pp 4). In the PNPM-Rural project 
cycle, project selection is determined by a participatory planning cycle, although community is 
expected to also get involved in implementation and monitoring of the project. With the defi nition 
above, this study focuses on the participation of marginalized groups in the planning process, from 
the hamlet planning meeting (Musdus) to the inter-village meeting (MAD).
Th is study hypothesizes that elite groups and “activists group” dominate village decision-making 
processes. Marginalized group are often not included in the decision-making process. Th is study 
examines two factors that hinder participation of marginalized groups: 
 Socio-economic structure of the village community. Th e socio-economic structure of the 
village can form a barrier to marginalized groups’ participation. Elite groups dominate 
decision-making processes, although the elite’s role varies within the process. Th is study 
fi nds, however, that within those variations elites dominate the decision-making process; 
in general marginalized groups do not participate in the planning process. Th is study also 
looks at how the project benefi ts certain groups in the village. 
 Technical Barriers. Although one of PNPM-Rural’s key components is participatory 
planning, this study fi nds that there are limitations and weaknesses in the program design 
that can limit the PNPM-Rural’s capacity to promote marginalized groups. One notable 
component of PNPM-Rural’s design that aff ects the quality of participation includes the 
capacity of facilitators to increase marginalized groups’ participation. 
1.3.2 Data collection 
To answer the research questions, this study employed qualitative methods. Data was collected 
through in-depth interviews with informants, focus group discussions, participant observation, 
and secondary data collection. Specifi cally for each research question, data was collected as follows:
 To identify who participates in PNPM-Rural and who does not, researchers examined the 
socio-economic structure of the community through the poverty map of the village, 
or, if not available, through poverty mapping conducted by researchers. Subsequently, 
researchers identifi ed who participates and who does not by examining documentation of 
PNPM-Rural meetings. Identifi cation of those playing an important role in the decision-
making process was examined through observation at PNPM-Rural meetings and in-depth 
interviews with diff erent groups within the community (pamong, elites, the community 
at large, and marginalized households). In each village, researchers interviewed pamong 
(Village Heads, BPD), PNPM-Rural teams (KPMD and TPK), members of savings and 
loan groups (SPP), at least ten poor households, and at least fi ve informants from the 
majority group. 
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 To examine barriers to participation for certain groups, researchers conducted in-depth 
interviews with various groups in the community. Th e researchers also analyzed the 
PNPM-Rural project design and conducted interviews with PNPM-Rural actors from the 
village to national level. 
 To look on how the project can be improved, researchers conducted analysis on the design of 
PNPM-Rural programs and interviewed PNPM-Rural actors, including in the World Bank 
and the Offi  ce of Community Empowerment at the Ministry of Home Aff airs (PMD). 
Researchers also drew on experience from similar programs that focus on increasing the 
participation of marginalized groups, such as PEKKA, and the experience of a local NGO 
in Kebumen with facilitating village development planning. 
Data collection was conducted from October to December 2009. Th ere were six teams covering six 
provinces. Each team consisted of one coordinator and two members. Research teams spent 14–15 
days in each village. During fi eldwork, the teams conducted discussions regularly to compare their 
data. Supervision from AKATIGA and from the World Bank was conducted to ensure the quality 
of data.  In each village, research teams presented their fi ndings to the community. At the end of 
fi eldwork, a workshop was held at AKATIGA to discuss the main fi ndings. 
1.3.3 Research Locations 
Th is study covers 24 villages in 12 kecamatan selected across 6 provinces. Th e provinces chosen for 
this study were: Papua, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, West Sumatra, West Java, and NTB. 
Th ese provinces were chosen based upon the following factors: (i) already included in the PNPM 
Governance Study (in order to get more in-depth information on diff erent aspects of PNPM 
performance in certain areas); (ii) provinces have not yet been studied intensively in KDP’s nine 
year history; and (iii) geographical diversity representing island groups.
In these six provinces, a total of 24 rural villages in 12 kecamatans of 11 Kabupaten were selected. 
Sampling of the villages followed these criteria:
 Purposeful selection of kecamatan by poverty ranking in two categories: one poor and one 
medium/wealthy. 
 Within each kecamatan, one rural village was selected randomly, and the second was 
the village considered poorest, based upon discussions with the local governments and 
Kabupaten facilitator.  
Of the 24 villages, there are 10 villages that had been involved with KDP since the project’s 
inception: all the villages in West Nusa Tenggara, two villages in West Java, two villages in South 
Sulawesi, and two villages in Papua. 
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Table 1.1 Research Locations
Province Kabupaten
West Sumatra - Pesisir Selatan 
- Agam
West Java - Karawang
- Cianjur
West Kalimantan - Pontianak
West Nusa Tenggara - Dompu
- West Lombok
South Sulawesi - Takalar
- Wajo 
Papua - Paniai
- Biak
For the purposes of confi dentiality, this report does not list the full name of the villages and 
kecamatan selected. Th is report also changes the name of the villages and kecamatans in presenting 
a case or an example. 
1.4 Report Structure 
Chapter 1 provides a brief explanation of PNPM-Rural and background of the study. Chapter 
2 describes the socio-economic structure of the village community, who participates in PNPM-
Rural, and the forms of intervention by certain groups in the village community. Chapter 3 
elaborates on factors that limit marginalized groups’ participation in PNPM-Rural. Chapter 4 
provides recommendations. 
Photo by Akatiga
Photo by Akatiga
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PNPM-Rural
Corroborating previous studies, this study fi nds that marginalized groups have limited participation 
in the decision making processes of PNPM-Rural in comparison to other groups in the village. 
We hypothesized that the level of participation of marginalized groups is determined by the 
socio-economic structure of the village and the ability of PNPM-Rural’s design and facilitation to 
overcome these barriers to participation. In this chapter, we will analyze this interaction to see who 
participates and who does not, and their level of participation. 
2.1 Socio-economic Structure and Village Decision 
Making
Groupings in the community are not neatly confi ned within economic strata as the term 
“marginalized” implies. Th ey can cross or overlap economic groups. Th e relationship between the 
‘poor’ and the ‘wealthy’ is also less dependent. Land ownership does not always determine the 
categorization of ‘poor’ and ‘wealthy’, as found in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Agricultural 
Photo by Juliana Wilson
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workers are not dependent on land owners for income and help during hard times (see Box 2.1). 
However, the opposite holds in one of the districts in West Java where a large suppy of agricultural 
workers (compared to the demand) makes the competition to fi nd work fi ercer and thus it is 
improtant that the workers maintain their relations with the land owners.
Box 2.18 Relationship of the Poor and the Wealthy, West Sumatra
Agriculture and fi shery are the dominant sources of income for villagers in Khi, West Sumatra. 
Approximately 90 percent of the population in two of its hamlets work as agricultural laborers, while in 
the other two hamlets, 75 percent of the population are farmers—they own or control land.
Villagers take the view that having a piece of land, however large it is, does not necessarily make one 
wealthy, given that crops can fail, as they did just prior to our fi eldwork. Agricultural workers, however, 
are always considered poor but they have more ‘fl exibility’ to fi nd other work in case of crop failure. 
Th ey can work individually or in a group. Th e members of the group often change. Th ey do not always 
work for the same land owners, either. Often a farmer would ask one worker to fi nd a group of workers 
to help him on his land. To meet their needs, agricultural workers prefer to borrow from the warung (a 
small store), instead of borrowing cash from landowners.
In the fi shermen’s hamlet, when they need cash, the fi shermen’s workers and small boat owners will go 
to the toke (middlemen) for help. Th ey pay the toke back with their catch. However, their debt to the 
toke is never large.
Based on discussions with villagers in the study sites, generally there are four major groups in 
village community: the elite, the activists, the majority and the marginalized group/s. Each has its 
own characteristics and infl uence over village aff airs.
2.1.1 Village Elite 
Patron-client relationships, such as those between wealthy landowners and their workers, are viewed 
as a barrier to the participation of the poor. However, this study fi nds that in general the economic 
and social elites, except village offi  cials, do not participate in the village decision-making processes. 
Th e elite include the wealthy, the leaders of village government, as well as religious and customary 
leaders (ninik mamak in West Sumatra, clan leaders in Papua, or banjar leaders of Hindu community 
in West Nusa Tenggara). 
Th e wealthy own most assets in the village—they own land, rice fi elds, and rice mills. Usually their 
economic activities extend beyond the village’s boundaries—they supply basic goods from cities to 
villages or they act as middlemen for the village’s main products. Except when a particular project 
or activity will benefi t them (e.g, irrigation canals) they are generally not interested in the decision-
making processes at the village level, although they are invited to and are informed about village 
activities and development programs. Generally they view the funds the village manages are too 
small to warrant their attention.
8 Unless otherwise noted, information/data was collected from the fi eld.
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Pamong or village offi  cials, including the Village Head, naturally have a substantial infl uence on 
village decision-making. Th ey are not necessarily the wealthiest in the village, but their status as 
government offi  cials gives them infl uence. Th ey are most dominant when there is little competition 
for infl uence from the other elites. As government offi  cials, they gain information on development 
projects earlier than the rest of the community.
Religious leaders (ulama, Tuan Guru Haji in the Muslim community in West Nusa Tenggara) tend 
to have little infl uence in the village decision-making process, except in West Java. Religious leaders 
still play an important role in family and community events (such as deaths, births, or marriages) 
and in religious holidays/ceremonies, but they are rarely involved in village meetings. Clan and 
ethnic leaders, however, still have a strong infl uence in village decision-making processes, notably 
in West Sumatra and Papua. Th e ninik mamak in West Sumatra are clan leaders and are respected 
by their clan members. Th e clan leaders in Papua are often civil servants and church leaders, hence 
doubling their power and infl uence. 
2.1.2 Village Activists
Village activists are those who possess knowledge of government projects and use that knowledge 
to become involved in these projects. Th ey are generally not in the government structure, but 
have close relations with the elite, particularly with the village offi  cials. Th ese relations come from 
their activities in village organizations, such as farmers’ groups, Posyandu (village health center for 
mothers and children), PKK (government-led women’s group), or pengajian (Koran recital groups), 
and in political parties. Like offi  cials, most activists are not wealthy.
2.1.3 Majority Group 
People in the “majority group” are those who have small assets or have regular income, such as small 
land-owners, ojeg drivers (motorcycle taxi drivers), small industry workers, or mobile vendors. Th ey 
are the majority of the village’s population.  In general, this group’s involvement is very limited in 
the village decision-making process. 
2.1.4 Marginalized Groups
Marginalized groups are almost always excluded from village meetings and development activities, 
unless, as in a few cases, they happen to be related to government offi  cials. People in this group 
have the following characteristics:
 
1. Own low-value assets or no assets at all. In West Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and West 
Sumatra they are the agricultural workers or they control a small piece of land, usually 
rain-fed. Between harvesting seasons, or when there are crop failures, they go to town to 
fi nd menial jobs, or they supplement their income by collecting wood or honey, fi shing, or 
hunting. In West Kalimantan marginalized groups often work as plantation workers, small 
fi shermen, and fi shing boat workers. Th e marginalized in South Sulawesi are similar: they 
are often agricultural workers and small fi shermen (they do not own their own boats). In 
Biak (Papua), marginalized groups may own a small parcel of land (140 m2); a few of them 
have larger plots of land but they are largely uncultivated and have only a few beetle nut 
trees.
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2. Live in outlying areas and have limited access to economic and social infrastructure. 
Each village has at least one isolated kampung/dusun (hamlet) with little access to the 
village center and basic services. Some of them can only be reached on foot or by boat. 
Th ey may have fertile land or other natural resources, but their isolation leads to poverty 
and negatively impacts educational attainment levels as well as access to and use of health 
services.
3. Have low income and a large number of dependents. Many female-headed households, 
elderly, and diff ables fall into this category, their dependents may include many school-age 
children and elderly family members.
4. Are from an ethnic or religious minority. In West Kalimantan, poor Chinese Indonesians 
consistute a minority (they are usually a religious minority as well), they are invited rarely 
to participate in village or even hamlet meetings. Only a few of them receive government’s 
assistance, such as the cash transfers. In Papua, people from diff erent clans (considered 
inferior by the majority) are also excluded from decision-making processes. Unlike 
marginalized groups having the other three characteristics, ethnic/religious minorities tend 
to be overlooked by facilitators and village leaders. Table 2.1 below provides a summary the 
groups’ involvement in village decision-making.
Table 2.1 Summary: Community Involvement in Village Decision-Making
Groups Involvement in Village Decision-Making 
Th e Wealthy Most of time, the wealthy are well informed about development programs and 
are invited to attend village meetings, but they choose not to get involved, 
unless they can see that the program will directly benefi t their business (e.g, 
building irrigation cannals). 
Pamong or village 
leaders 
Village leaders are well informed about development programs and are actively 
involved in village meetings.
Customary leaders Customary leaders are well informed about development programs and are 
actively involved in village meetings 
Religious leaders Religious leaders are well informed about development programs, but less active 
in the village meetings, thus have less infl uence in the decision-making process. 
Activists Activists are well informed and actively participated in the village meetings. 
Th ey are also involved in the implementation of development programs. 
Majority group Th e majority group is not active in village meetings and thus have no infl uence 
in the decision-making process, but, in general, people in this category are more 
informed about development programs than the marginalized. Th e majority 
will be involved in development programs if they have close relationship with 
village offi  cials or customary leaders. 
Marginalized groups Th e marginalized are not well informed about development program in the 
village, and therefore are not active in village meetings. Th ey may become 
involved in the implementation of or be the target groups/benefi ciaries of a 
program, particularly when they have close relationship with village offi  cials or 
activists.
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2.2 Participation in PNPM-Rural
Despite the presence of facilitators, participation in PNPM-Rural—particularly in decision 
making—is dominated by the elite (especially the village heads/offi  cials) and activists. In many 
cases, village facilitators fail to facilitate. Th is section will discuss how and in which areas the 
offi  cials and activists participate. Some examples of best practice do occur. 
Offi  cials’ involvement in PNPM-Rural is generally intended to ensure that their agenda or 
programs are funded. Th ese agenda are not necessarily self-centered, as seen with the village head 
in Desa Cng, West Java, and his support for proposals from the poor. Village offi  cials may conceive 
the idea themselves and openly or covertly infl uence or lead others to support the idea. When 
there is no other competing elite group, offi  cials can even make the decision outside the formal 
mechanism of PNPM-Rural, as seen in several villages in West Java, West Kalimantan, and West 
Nusa Tenggara (Box 2.2 provides an example in West Java).
Box 2.2 Mobilizing Support for Proposals from the ‘Top’, West Java
Cng is located in Kabupaten Cianjur, West Java. PNPM-Rural started in this village in 2008. From the 
fi rst year, the village head actively shaped the village’s proposals. Before the musyawarah desa (village 
meeting) he gathered all the hamlet heads, the chair of BPD (village legislative body), and the LPM 
(community council) and asked them to support the proposal to renovate the village market. Th e 
proposal originally came from the Musrenbangdes (village development planning meeting) process. Th e 
market renovation was expected to increase the village’s revenue from market fees and stall rental. In 
return, the village head promised to repair drainage canals and provide an incentive in the form of 
20 bags of cement using the ADD (village grants from the district). Next, the village head asked the 
neighborhood head (RT) from the market area to mobilize his villagers to attend the musyawarah desa 
to support the proposal. In return, this RT would manage market parking and the neighborhood youth 
group would manage the toilets, each one receiving any revenue generated. Th en, the village head 
selectively shared the information on the PNPM-Rural meetings only to his circle of supporters. His 
maneuver won him the proposal for the market renovation for Rp228 million.
“Come on, my village is the center of the sub-district—it would be embarrassing if we still have dirt 
roads. Th e village grant is too small. So I used PNPM-Rural instead.” 
(Village Head in West Kalimantan)
Elite steering of PNPM-Rural money infl uences participation levels. Village offi  cials work both 
inside and outside PNPM-Rural procedures to ensure that certain proposals will be approved. 
For example, outside the formal procedures, offi  cials from diff erent villages or hamlets negotiate 
or agree among themselves which proposals they would support at the next stage. Some village 
heads decided upfront to rotate PNPM-Rural funds (e.g., in Jok and Jbu, West Sumatra, and Jat, 
West Kalimantan). Th ey select both the hamlets and the projects each hamlet will receive, based 
on their own agenda (such as paving the main road in every hamlet in West Kalimantan). Village 
offi  cials may see this rotation as fair because it ensures every village/hamlet gets a turn, but this 
strategy undermines the spirit of PNPM-Rural. Th e hamlets that will not be receiving funds had 
no incentive or interest in participating in planning discussions and other related activities; they 
just wait for their turn.  
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Table 2.2 Th e Role of Offi  cials and Activists
Stage of PNPM-
Rural Process Form of “intervention” Note
Information 
dissemination 
Deciding who to invite to 
meetings, even when there 
is no intention to get votes 
for a particular proposal
 KPMD and TPK ask hamlet leaders to invite the 
villagers for hamlet meetings
Hamlet Meetings Initiating specifi c proposals  Customary or religious leaders propose activities 
that are related to their specifi c interests, e.g., 
religious leaders propose renovation of a madrasah. 
Facilitating proposals from 
marginalized groups
 Activists, usually from non-governmental 
organizations, facilitate meetings with marginalized 
groups prior to hamlet meetings and bring the 
results to the hamlet meetings. In Biak, activists 
include civil servants who were the rivals of the 
pamong. 
Conditioning or steering 
participants to accept a 
particular proposal
 Hamlet leaders tell the audience what is considered 
to be an important project for their hamlet.
 Activists provide arguments to support proposals 
coming from the group they represent or from 
themselves. 
 Village Head attends hamlet meetings to argue for 
a particular project.
Village Meetings Directing participants 
to prioritize a particular 
proposal 
 Village Head directs the discussion to prioritize a 
particular proposal at the village meetings. 
 TPK directs the discussion to prioritize proposals 
from certain hamlets (for instance, hamlets that 
have not won before). 
Mobilization to vote for 
or against a particular 
proposal 
 Hamlet leaders mobilize their people to attend 
village meetings to vote for proposals from their 
hamlets, or lobby other hamlet leaders to vote for 
their proposal. 
 Activists mobilize people from a hamlet to vote for 
or against a particular proposal at village meetings. 
MAD Lobby and negotiation 
between villages to win 
certain proposals 
 Village heads and TPK conduct meetings with 
other village heads and TPK to negotiate and 
coordinate support for their proposal at the Inter-
village meeting (MAD). Th ey agree on which 
village’s proposal will win in what year. 
 Th is study also fi nds cases where village leaders 
bring their own proposals to MAD. In West Java, 
the Village Head brought a diff erent proposal that 
originated from the village’s mid-term plan. 
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Th e other highly involved group in most villages is the activist group. Some of them participate 
directly as PNPM-Rural main actors, such as KPMD or join the TPK (the implementing team). 
In most cases these activists cum PNPM-Rural actors, particularly the KPMD, are unable to 
circumvent the domination of the offi  cials or other elites; often they go along with them. Th e 
KPMD’s role can be critical because they usually decide whom to invite to the diff erent meetings. 
Hence, they help shape the level and quality of participation in the village, for better or for worse. 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the “interventions” by village offi  cials and activists in the PNPM-
Rural process.
KPMD with low capacity do not always receive the support they need from the FK or the Faskab 
(Kabupaten Facilitator), who are over-loaded with administrative work in addition to facilitating 
communities across a wide geographic area. Even if an FK makes himself available, he may not 
have the capacity to adequately support local staff /volunteers. (To be further discussed in Chapter 
3).  
When PNPM-Rural actors—KPMD coupled with supporting FK—are good, PNPM-Rural is at 
its best. Examples found during this research of PNPM Rural at its best come from a village in 
West Java that shows high capacity in organizing villagers (see Box 2.3) and in a village in West 
Nusa Tenggara where the banjar system in the Hindu-Balinese community is still strong. Every 
household, as a member of the banjar, is required to attend meetings to discuss banjar-related 
aff airs, including PNPM-Rural.
Photo by Akatiga
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Box 2.3 Good Facilitation for Participation of Marginalized Groups 
Cng is located in Kabupaten Cianjur, West Java. Th is village is well known among the Cianjur PNPM-
Rural team because it received PNPM-Rural grants consecutively in 2008 and 2009, which is unusual. 
Th e village received two projects in 2008 alone; renovation for a suspension bridge in Pasir Sireum and 
eight public baths in Bencoy. Both were poor hamlets. Participation of the marginalized populations is 
much higher here: 50 percent of the participants in village meetings came from marginalized groups. 
Hamlet meetings were attended by anywhere from 52-258 participants. Meetings are held in hamlets 
and continue to the village, where marginalized groups constituted over 50 percent of participants. 
Several factors determined the participation rates of marginalized groups in Cng. First, the facilitators 
(KPMD and TPK) used eff ective methods of socialization. KPMDs approached diff erent groups within 
the community to explain the PNPM-Rural program and to stress the importance of attending meetings 
so their proposal would win. Th ey also asked the Village Head to invite hamlet leaders. Th is strategy 
worked to increase the number of people coming to hamlet meetings. 
Secondly, these facilitators have a long track record working with the community. Th ey came from a local 
pesantren and local NGO with a long history of community programs, including providing economic 
assistance for poor groups in Cng. Th e facilitators have developed their network and information on 
which village institutions they can use to socialize PNPM-Rural. In addition, members of TPK and the 
KPMD have good interpersonal skills, high mobility, and strong personal fi nancial resources. 
Good facilitation in Cng is also supported by the existence of institutions working for community 
empowerment and creation of program cadre. 
A glance at the local institutions
Th e two local institutions where the KMPD and TKP come from are, respectively, a pesantren and an 
NGO that organizes a women’s credit group. Th e pesantren not only provides religious education to its 
students, but also actively provides training on small business activities, such as catfi sh breeding, for the 
community. Th eir activities, including their Koran recitation group and pre-school, serve as a place for 
villagers to get information on government’s programs, such as rice for the poor, birth certifi cates, ID 
cards, and, of course, PNPM-Rural.
Beyond providing micro-credit for women, the NGO also helps ensure that the women have savings 
to pay for their children’s education and health care. Th e NGO and the pesantren consistently voice the 
needs of the poor in Cng.
“ I attended the meeting even though I didn’t say anything, because Pak Kadus invited me.”
(Villager in West Kalimantan) 
Cases like the ones in West Java and West Nusa Tenggara are exceptions. By and large participation 
in the decision-making process by the majority and marginalized groups is very limited. Of the 
two groups, the majority is usually more informed about PNPM-Rural and more of them attend 
PNPM-Rural meetings. However, when members of the majority propose their ideas, they do not 
receive support. Marginalized groups fair far worse. Most people in marginalized groups do not 
know about the PNPM-Rural program and are not invited to hamlet meetings, let alone village 
meetings. When they are invited and come, they are passive participants—only listening or just 
saying “aye” to the ideas they like. It is more likely their interests are picked up or discussed in the 
meetings when they have close relationships with offi  cials or activists, or when they are of interest 
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to the other groups, such as in Kia Village, West Sumatra. In Kia, many villagers own land and are 
related to the villagers in the isolated hamlet. Hence, the community-at-large supported building 
a road to improve access from and to the isolated hamlet. Marginalized groups are most involved 
as construction workers in PNPM-Rural projects (rather than as participants in planning and 
development as defi ned in this study). 
2.3 Women’s Participation
PNPM-Rural specifi cally targets women as program benefi ciaries. Th ey have special meetings to 
discuss their own proposals (MKP) and they provide loans only for women (SPP). Th is study 
confi rms previous studies that PNPM-Rural increases participation from women due to this specifi c 
targeting (Decentralization Support Facility, 2007). However, getting women to participate more 
does not mean that marginalized groups participate. Th is study identifi ed three characteristics of 
the “women’s component”. First, many of the women who attend MKP are usually prospective 
borrowers for SPP (see Box 2.4). Th e rest of the attendees are activists or related to pamong. 
Secondly, women’s proposals focus on health and education issues, such as setting up a pre-
school, community health services, public toilets, or building village health centers (posyandu). 
With few exceptions, proposals related to pre-schools (and other health and education initiatives) 
usually fail at the Intervillage Meeting (MAD) because they rank lower in terms of the number of 
benefi ciaries compared to other projects.9 Th irdly, women’s meetings are sometimes used by other 
groups to propose a particular project, knowing the women’s proposals stand a bigger chance of 
winning (cases found in South Sulawesi and West Java). Women should not always be considered 
a marginalized group. Th e special mechanism does increase women’s participation but it is not 
necessarily an eff ective means for realizing their ideas. 
9 According to the Operations Manual, proposals are to be evaluated based on the number of poor reached. Th is study 
found that in practice communities often use the total number of benefi ciaries, rather then total number of poor 
benefi ciaries, as one of their selection criteria.
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Box 2.410 Setting Up a Savings-and-Loan Group
L is the wife the of TPK’s treasurer in Cin, Kabupaten Karawang, West Java. Her husband told her about 
PNPM-Rural and its SPP component, and encouraged her to form a group to access the loan.
L shared this information with her neighbors, and some of them agreed to form a group. Th ey appointed 
L as the leader because of her higher level of education and her knowledge on SPP. She is also wealthier 
compared to her neighbors, so the UPK feels comfortable and expects that when the group members 
cannot pay their installments on time, she can pay for them. When the proposal came, the UPK did not 
bother to check the details.
L, of course, did not want to take the risk that her members might default on their payments. She 
selected her members carefully and only approved those who already ran a business, such as mobile 
phone voucher vendors or those operating a small store (warung). L herself owned a small stall in front 
of her house. 
While L’s selection criteria guaranteed good repayment rates, it defi nitely excluded the marginalized 
women from accessing the credit. In this case, SPP benefi ted women from the majority group and the 
activists. 
2.4 Marginalized Groups and the Beneﬁ ts of 
 PNPM-Rural 
Despite the limited participation of most marginalized groups, they do benefi t from PNPM-Rural 
projects, particularly public goods, such as roads, bridges, and public baths/toilets. As shown in the 
previous sections, PNPM-Rural is often the only project that reaches isolated areas. PNPM-Rural 
improves their access to basic services, and provides work to the poor as construction laborers. In 
fact, working as construction laborers is probably the part of PNPM-Rural where marginalized 
groups “participate” in the most. 
If using the defi nition of participation stated at the beginning of this report, it can be said that 
marginalized groups have low levels of participation in PNPM-Rural. Th ey may share some of the 
benefi ts, they may be invited to discussions and be passive participants. One or two of them may 
be sneaked into SPP groups for the sake looking inclusive, but there is no place for their voice. Call 
it symbolic participation.
10 Unless otherwise noted, information/data are collected from the fi eld.
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Chapter 2 shows that participation in the PNPM-Rural decision-making process is limited to the 
elite, particularly village offi  cials, and activist groups. Th e majority group is involved in the Musdus, 
but their participation is not found at subsequent stages of the process. Marginalized groups are 
even less involved; most of them do not know what PNPM-Rural is. However, this study also fi nds 
that the benefi ts of PNPM-Rural, especially infrastructure projects, are enjoyed by the community 
at large. While most isolated communities benefi ted less from infrastructure projects, there are 
cases where the project reaches them. When that happens, PNPM-Rural is usually the only project 
to reach the isolated area. Th is chapter explores the barriers to marginalized group’s participation. 
 
3.1 Structural Barriers 
Structural barriers and limitations in the PNPM-Rural design contribute to the low participation 
rates of marginalized groups. Structural barriers refer to the socio-economic structure of the village 
that provides legitimacy and opportunity to the pamong and activist groups that allows them to 
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dominate the PNPM-Rural decision-making process. Limitations to the PNPM-Rural design refer 
to the project’s lack of capacity to overcome these structural barriers that ultimately limit the 
participation of marginalized groups. 
As mentioned above, the wealthy are not involved in PNPM-Rural. Among the elites, the pamong 
are the only group who are actively involved in PNPM-Rural. Th e wealthiest in the community are 
generally not interested in being involved because: 1) the benefi ts of PNPM-Rural, especially the 
PNPM-Rural SPP program, are too small to add meaningfully to their income; 2) benefi ts of most 
infrastructure projects will accrue to them without them having to participate in the process. Th e 
wealthiest only become involved in PNPM-Rural when the benefi ts of an infrastructure project are 
signifi cant to their business. Th e wealthy may become involved if they are close to the pamong or 
village leaders, such as in Biak (Papua). In Biak, the wealthiest in the community make decisions 
on land use and are among the pamong’s close circle due to their position as landowners and clan 
leaders. 
In PNPM-Rural, the role of customary and religious leaders is limited.  For instance, in Lombok 
Barat, Tuan Guru Haji can ask for the labor fees to be donated to his pesantren, but his suggestion 
to propose pesantren renovation was rejected in the meeting. Religious leaders are still important in 
family/individual events (such as birth, death, or marriage) and in religious ceremonies. Th ey are 
still invited to the meetings on development projects, but they are less infl uential in the decision-
making process.  Th e exception is in West Java where ulama are still actively involved in the 
decision-making process as an activist group. 
Participation of the majority is limited to attendance at the sub-village or hamlet meetings. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, when majority group members do attend meetings, they are usually 
unprepared and will create unfeasible proposals or proposals that do not take budget limitations 
into account. Th eir attendance at the higher stages of PNPM-Rural, such as in MDP and MAD, is 
limited to being mobilized to vote for certain projects. Pamong and activists select representatives 
from hamlets to participate in the next stages of PNPM-Rural. In several cases, pamong (especially 
hamlets leaders) purposely selected attendants for hamlet meetings. 
“ I am afraid to speak up in front of the audience, I am afraid I would say something wrong. I am a small person 
(orang kecil) and I don’t know anything about development. I didn’t ask either, I would not receive help anyway.” 
(One women from marginalized group in West Sumatra)
Participation of marginalized groups decreases as the PNPM-Rural cycle goes on. Representatives 
attending the next stages after MusDes are usually selected from the activist group because they are 
considered to be more articulate in defending the proposals. Table 3.1 shows the declining level of 
the majority and marginalized group’s participation.
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Table 3.1 Declining Participation 
Process Conditions in Research Areas
Dissemination 
and Invitations:
West Sumatra:
Information is easy to access and the majority group is invited to participate in 
meetings. In one village, village facilitators distributed invitations to marginalized 
groups, including those in isolated areas. 
West Java:
Dissemination of information is very limited to the elites and activists, except in Cng.
West Kalimantan:
In West Kalimantan the village population is dispersed over a large area. Information 
is limited to the elites and population at the center of the village.
South Sulawesi:
Information is generally well distributed; the majority is informed about PNPM-
Rural and the schedule of meetings. 
West Nusa Tenggara:
Information is not well distributed except in few cases (such in the Hindu-Muslim 
village Bip). Th e banjar system in the Hindu community helps to distribute 
information to even the most marginalized in the community. 
Papua:
In villages where power between clans is relatively equal, information is well 
distributed. In villages where there is domination by a certain clan, information is 
only distributed within the dominant clan. 
Attendance 
at hamlet 
meetings
West Sumatra:
Hamlet meetings are widely attended, but attendance is lower in the hamlet that 
knows they will not win that year. Interest in attending meetings mainly comes from 
potential members of SPP.
West Java:
Attendance of the majority and marginalized groups is better in some hamlets than 
others.
West Kalimantan:
Attendance of majority and marginalized groups is better in some hamlets than 
others.
South Sulawesi:
Sub-village meetings are widely attended.
West Nusa Tenggara:
Hamlet meetings are widely attended, but attendance is lower in the hamlet that 
knows they would not win in that year. 
Papua:
In villages where power distribution is relatively equal, attendance is high. But in the 
villages where power is dominated by a clan, only the elite of that clan attends. 
Attendance at 
the following 
stages
In all areas:
Meetings at the higher stages (MD, MAD) are only attended by representatives from 
hamlets and villages. 
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“PNPM-Rural gives us a real result, while Musrenbang is no more than a dream” 
(Villager in West Nusa Tenggara)
Initially, PNPM-Rural was seen as a fresh approach and villagers responded positively. In time, it 
returned to the ‘business as usual’ process of decision-making. In early 2003, the village of Seo, 
West Nusa Tenggara responded positively to PNPM-Rural (KDP at that time). Prior to KDP, 
Seo had never received any development funding. Th e process of musyawarah and clear amount 
of grant provided by KDP drew the community to participate, and resulted in the development 
of bridges and road that opened access to and from the village. However, from 2005-2008, their 
proposals consistently lost in the MAD. Responding to this loss, the pamong and activist groups 
developed strategies to win in the MAD again the following year. Together with the pamong and 
activists from other villages, they made an agreement to rotate the PNPM-Rural funds—thus 
proposals are not selected based on the priority or ranked (as stipulated in the Operations Manual), 
but based on the agreement. Money is also used to create agreement; activists/pamong from each 
village expect compensation (in the form of money) for their vote. 
Th is fi nding illustrates how PNPM-Rural turns into a political game between pamong and activists, 
not only within the same village but also between villages, to ensure that villages will have some 
funds in a particular year for development.  Marginalized and majority groups do not have the 
knowledge, capacity, or time to follow the PNPM-Rural process to the MAD stage. Th ey also do 
not see the immediate benefi t of the process, which further reduces their interest in participating. 
An example of this can be seen in West Sumatra where attendance of meetings is high when there 
is a guarantee that the participants will be included in the SPP. 
Shallow democratization process benefi ts pamong. Pamong and activists have more knowledge 
on the whole process and are more able to ‘modify’ or ‘manipulate’ the process for their interest 
(or, at least, for their village’s interest). For the whole village community, pamong and activists are 
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at the forefront of information on development programs, both from government and others. 
Th ey are seen as capable of talking to and dealing with program administrators, understanding 
the program’s mechanism and the requirements to win a proposal. For program administrators, 
pamong and activists are the legitimate community representatives who can translate the language 
of development into village activities and community languages. Pamong and activists also have 
resources (funds, capacity, and time—resources that many members of marginalized groups lack) to 
follow all the stages of a program’s cycle. Th ey also have the capacity to mediate between confl icting 
interests and fi nd a compromise, though the compromise may not be the most eff ective solution for 
the village. Th e pamong also benefi t most from PNPM-Rural, though it is not necessarily through 
corruption or manipulation. By leading the process, a pamong gains political and social recognition, 
which eventually will increase their income. In one village in West Sumatra, for instance, a village 
activist was simultaneously involved in village pemekaran (division of villages) and working hard 
to ensure that his village’s proposal would win in the Intervillage Meeting (MAD). Th e village 
community saw him as a hero. He gradually was seen as a customary leader, and when the village 
won another round of PNPM-Rural, he became one of the village facilitators. In one village in 
Papua, the community agreed that the facilitator’s house should receive fi rst priority for bathroom 
and toilet improvement.
Pamong and activists are seen as eff ective representatives and develop legitimacy to run 
the project as the process of decision-making becomes routine. PNPM-Rural is designed to 
increase participation, yet its long, multi-tiered decision-making process and the competition 
process at the kecamatan level discourage participation of the majority and marginalized, who do 
not believe they can eff ectively represent themselves in the MAD.  For them, it is safer if pamong 
and activists represent them in that meeting because these actors have more knowledge and skill 
with development projects, including negotiation and advocacy skills. In one village in West Nusa 
Tenggara, for instance, participation was high in the fi rst and second year, but decreased in the 
third year as decision-making became routine. Th e community considers that any infrastructure 
project will benefi t the community, thus they tend to let the pamong and activists decide which 
infrastructure project will be proposed.
“How can I participate when my bowl of rice is still empty?” 
(A villager in West Sumatra) 
Marginalized groups have greater barriers to participation compared to majority groups. Th e 
structural barriers and limitations of the PNPM-Rural design discussed above are exacerbated by 
conditions specifi c to certain marginalized groups. For instance, in West Kalimantan marginalized 
groups tend to live in outlying areas and have limited access to the village offi  ce. Th e transportation 
costs required to get to the meeting often exceeds their income. In West Java, the marginalized 
groups encountered during research work at menial jobs and their time is consumed in meeting 
their basic needs; they do not have time to get involved in the PNPM-Rural process. In some 
areas, marginalized groups also depend on the pamong for access to free government services (such 
as Kartu Miskin for health service access). Also, they may depend on the wealthy and/or activists 
group to get a job (see Box 3.1 for an example). With these strong barriers, special eff ort needs to 
be taken to ensure marginalized groups’ participation.
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Box 3.1 Persistent Dependency of Marginalized Group on Activists
J is a widow with four children who lives in Jat, West Kalimantan. Her husband passed away 7 years 
ago and left them in poverty. J’s family gets their food from the garden and fi eld around her house. 
Occasionally, when J has some money, they will buy food from the local food stall (warung). J was 
invited to join SPP by S, the administrator of SPP in Jat. S herself is not wealthy, but one of her relatives, 
Su, owns a copra production and a rice mill. 
J never speaks much in the SPP meetings, and she only took a small amount of credit. Her interest and 
needs are channelled through S. Su and S often give her small jobs to supplement her income. 
Th eoretically, PNPM-Rural should be able to reduce the gap between people like J and Su, but this has 
not happened. Very poor people, such as J, depend heavily on their relationships with people like Su. 
People like J will follow Su’s and S’ guidance and suggestions on most matters. Th ey will not speak their 
mind due to the risk of damaging their relationship with people like S and Su. Th ey need an institution 
that can help them to reduce their vulnerability and create more jobs, thus reducing their dependency 
to people like S and Su. 
Marginalized group’s participation can be improved when there is special facilitation support 
that focuses on this group and when pro-poor village institutions are available.  PEKKA 
(the Female-Headed Household Empowerment Program) provides an illustration on how the 
intervention of pamong and activists can be limited. Th is program targets poor women heads-
of-household. Four elements of empowerment within PEKKA include: 1) building critical of 
awareness on women’s rights as citizens, women, and human beings; 2) capacity building; 3) 
organization and network development; and 4) advocacy. Currently PEKKA covers eight provinces 
in Indonesia (PEKKA, 2010). Th is project defi nes clearly that the target group is only poor female 
heads–of-households. If PNPM established a very clear target group, the pamong and activists 
could not claim to be poor or receive any benefi ts from the program.11 
A strong, pro-poor village institution helps improve the participation of marginalized groups. 
In Cng, West Java, a pesantren and women’s saving group has been the means of facilitating 
marginalized groups’ participation in the community. As we can see from Chapter 2, the proposal 
from the marginalized group won in the MAD, and there was substantial attendance from the 
marginalized even at the MAD level. In Bip, West Nusa Tenggara, the banjar system in Hindu 
community ensures participation of all banjar members, including marginalized groups. 
Good facilitation can reduce elite intervention, as seen in cases from Cng (West Java) and Bip 
(West Nusa Tenggara). Facilitators in Cng have good interpersonal and communication skills, and 
understand the social-economic groups in Cng. With their skills and knowledge, they can persuade 
village leaders during PNPM-Rural meetings. Th rough personal outreach, KPMDs in Cng are able 
to get marginalized groups to attend the Musdus and MDP.  
Th ere are also cases outside this study that show how elite’s interest can be developed to facilitate 
the poor. In Kebumen, for instance, a local NGO was able to encourage several village heads to 
include marginalized groups in their development plans. Good village heads that promote the 
interests of marginalized groups have been held up as examples of best practice. Th ey have become 
11 Interview with Ela Hasanah, October 2009
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resource persons for other villages and other poverty reduction programs, and are invited to attend 
meetings with Kebumen’s top offi  cials including the Bupati. Th e NGO reports corrupt village 
heads to the police.12
In the long term, PNPM-Rural’s relevance to the poor depends on its ability to provide more 
economic benefi ts to the target group. Marginalized groups will see that PNPM-Rural is relevant 
to them once the program can increase their income or provide infrastructure that truly benefi ts 
them. Th ere is a gap between the present economic condition of the marginalized and the kind of 
steps and strategies necessary to raise signifi cantly their daily income and increase village economic 
activity by 15 percent, as expected in the PNPM-Rural design. 
Th is study fi nds there is a diff erence between providing aid and supplying good assistance. A good 
example of this is seen in West Nusa Tenggara. Villagers used funds from the PNPM-Rural pilot 
project SADI (Smallholder Agribusiness Development Initiative) in Bip, West Nusa Tenggara, to 
buy a machine to process corn into corn chips, but without a proper feasibility study on the type of 
corn planted in the village. After the purchase, villagers discovered that the press machine was not 
strong enough to press the corn, and at the same time, the machine’s maintenance cost was beyond 
the poor’s capacity to pay and the investment return was too low for the middle and wealthy to get 
involved. Eventually the machine was left untouched in one of the community member’s homes.
But in West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi, there are examples of best practice wherein private 
sector investment introduced new technology into local seaweed production. Along with the 
technology, the community also learned how to recognize which varieties of seaweed are appropriate 
12 Interview with Yusuf Murtiono from Formasi, a civil society forum in Kebumen working on village participatory 
planning, May 2010 
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for specifi c environments, how to manage their cash fl ow, and make investments. Th ey also learned 
how to conduct quality control that leads to purchase guarantees from buyers. (Sulistyo, 2004)
Participation can also be improved when institutional processes truly change social dynamics.  As 
the experience from PEKKA in West Lombok shows, deepening participation in the sub-village 
and village meetings, as well as the MAD, results in more substantial outcomes. In West Lombok, 
there is a new system for electing village heads. Th e community fi rst lists several persons they 
consider to be trustworthy and helpful. Th en, from this list they identify those who are willing to 
be selected. In East Nusa Tenggara, women and people from the lower customary level are now able 
to hold the position of Village Head. All these approaches have increased participation because the 
community can see that their choice is truly meaningful.
3.2 Technical Limitations of the PNPM-Rural Project 
Design & Support Systems 
While socio-economic conditions can limit the participation of marginalized groups in PNPM-
Rural, there are also technical limitations in the PNPM-Rural project design and support systems 
that limit participation. 
Th is study found that delays in fund disbursement, both operational funds and block grants, 
forces modifi cations in the fi eld that shorten the participatory planning process. Under these 
circumstances, there is neither capacity nor time for the KPMD and FK to deepen the participation 
process. In one village in West Sumatra, two meetings (musyawarah dusun and desa) were collapsed 
into one to make up for the delay. No separate meeting for women was held. Instead, in the same 
meeting the men were told to be quiet while the women proposed their ideas. Th is “shortcut” was 
repeated in the following year when the funds were delayed again.
Th e project has suffi  cient capacity to run the activities, but does not have enough capacity to 
control the quality. Th ere is also lack of input to improve the design to consistently focus on 
marginalized groups and to increase the value of the project in the village. 
Th e scaling-up of PNPM did not include improving the capacity of facilitators. To be just, 
facilitators in PNPM-Rural (from KPMDs to TPK) are good administrators. PNPM-Rural has 
improved some community members’ capacity with project administration. However, in general 
there is limited capacity to promote or advocate for the interests of marginalized groups. KPMDs 
in general recognize who the poor and marginalized are in their village, but this recognition is not 
followed by eff orts to bring this group into the PNPM-Rural process. 
Th ere is lack of qualifi ed candidates for FK and KPMDS. Many good FKs from PNPM-Rural’s 
predecessor, KDP, have moved on in their careers, often under donor projects, including PNPM. 
Good FKs usually have previous experience with community engagement, and in earlier stages of 
KDP, facilitators often came from NGOs or were campus activists. With the scaling up of PNPM-
Rural, demand for large numbers of facilitators drove quality down; it is hard to fi nd candidates 
with the same qualifi cations as seen in the early days of KDP. Many FKs in study areas were fresh 
graduates with no experience in community engagement. Th ey are unable to work as eff ectively 
with communities in comparison to village pamongs and activists. 
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Th e administrative burden in PNPM-Rural also reduces the ability for facilitators to adequately 
assist marginalized groups. Project capacity to monitor and ensure the quality facilitation is limited. 
Monitoring and Evaluation systems ensure that every stage of PNPM-Rural is conducted, but does 
not evaluate the quality of implementation. Monitoring is done by vertically within PNPM, while 
the coverage of the project is very wide. 
Monitoring & Evaluation focuses solely on administrative procedures. Monitoring for FKs 
and KPMDs is conducted by Kabupaten consultants, and is only focused on administration (i.e., 
whether all stages of PNPM-Rural have been executed). Th ere is no monitoring to examine the 
quality of participation of marginalized groups or to see if the PNPM-Rural intention to empower 
marginalized groups is being consistently applied during all stages of the project. Th ere is also 
consideration on how to address specifi c aspects of marginalization or how the next round of 
PNPM-Rural could deepen the participation process. Th us there is no expert capacity to address 
these issues built from this kind of substantive monitoring. Th ere is no pool of knowledge or a 
network that could be used by the village to support the project with continuous feedback. Th ere 
is also no clear mechanism on how to incorporate feedback into the project system. 
Th e project design does not accommodate the new challenges. With the expansion of the 
PNPM-Rural, there is a need to modify the design so that it would be able to focus more directly 
on helping the poor. Th e project should have a critical path and should focus on incorporating 
poor and marginalized groups more eff ectively into the system. While capacity building for PNPM-
Rural facilitators is also an important issue, the design has to be modifi ed so that it can: 1) increase 
project value to the community and 2) change the pamong’s attitudes and help them consider the 
interests of marginalized groups. 
Reporting system is complicated and absorbs most of facilitators’ time. All levels of facilitators 
are required to write up and compile all information on all program activities while they are also 
expected provide facilitation in villages. Our interviews with FKs, KPMDs, and Faskab show 
general agreement that reporting takes a signifi cant amount of their time and decreases their 
time for facilitation to the whole community, let alone working with marginalized groups in the 
community. Th e report formatting should be simplifi ed and only focus on the most strategic 
aspects of implementation. Th is format should be evaluated regularly and the feedback should be 
incorporated into improving the project design. Unless feedback impacts project design, reporting 
becomes just another administrative exercise. 
Box 3.2 Administrative Burden and FK Capacity
In Cianjur, West Java, a kecamatan with 18 villages is managed by 2 kecamatan facilitators: the 
empowerment facilitator (FK) and technical facilitator (FT). Each village holds 6-9 meetings, so the 
total for the kecamatan can reach 108 meetings. Each village has two KPMD (there are 36 KPMDs 
and 18 TPKs), but the FK and FT must to train and monitor them. With the number of reports 
they have to write, lack of experience, delay of funds disbursement, it is unsurprising that the FK and 
FT engagement facilitating marginalized groups is very limited. For junior facilitators, the concept 
and practice of participation is also new to them. Only 5-6 FKs in Kabupaten Cianjur had previous 
experience in community engagement.
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Beyond Symbolic Participation: 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, participation of marginalized groups is still limited. Generally they 
do not participate if we use the defi nition in this study (see Chapter 1). Th eir greatest role in the 
program is as paid laborers for the construction of public works. PNPM-Rural has done well in 
creating job opportunities in construction work for the rural poor; however, villagers, including the 
poor, provide a fraction of their labor for free as their in-kind contribution to project—willingly or 
unknowingly—hence reducing their net benefi ts.
Marginalized groups play little role in decision making beyond their neighborhood or hamlet. Th ey 
may come to their neighborhood or hamlet meetings, but they are passive participants. Th ey have 
little information to enable them to engage in the discussions, and little facilitation to prepare them 
to participate. As meetings move from hamlet, to village, to kecamatan (where major decisions are 
made), their participation decreases. In many cases, when they are included in the SPP groups, 
they do not even realize they will be receiving loans from the PNPM-Rural until just before the 
proposals are being verifi ed. Th eir inclusion is but a token one.
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Chapter 3 identifi es the main reasons for the limited participation. Th ere are certain obvious 
reasons: 1) being too poor to have (or aff ord) spare time for PNPM-Rural meetings and the traveling 
time; 2) inferiority of the marginalized groups—related to the dominance of the elite or better-
off  groups; and 3) simple exclusion (no information provided to them). Th ere are also problems 
related to social structure that the project design has not adequately dealt with, in addition to 
institutional and technical problems.
As a program that aims to empower communities, dominance by the elite groups is a major issue to 
anticipate. PNPM-Rural design includes facilitation by both external and internal agents (the FK 
and KPMD). Th is facilitation is expected to circumvent local elites. Th e design also assumes that 
the facilitated “democratic” processes will lead to the best decisions for the community. However, 
facilitation for empowerment is not a quick fi x nor can it be achieved through a repetitive, 
mechanistic process year in and year out. Empowerment needs time to deepen or advance gradually 
over time. Most FKs do not have the skills for (nor the awareness of ) this kind of facilitation.
Meanwhile, on the technical side of the problem, there is a high turnover of FKs in some kecamatan 
that clearly disrupts the work. Th ey also more geared toward administrative work and delegate the 
facilitation to the KPMD, who lacks suffi  cient training eff ectively facilitate. Both FK and KPMD 
are very fl uent in explaining all the steps of PNPM-Rural process but facilitating diff erent groups 
and encouraging marginalized groups to voice their needs is not their strength.
Weak facilitation is exacerbated by institutional problems, notably disbursement delays that 
occur frequently. Adjustments have to be made, often at the cost of the process.  Th e institutional 
capacity does not seem to have followed the exponential expansion of the project, from working in 
26 villages in the pilot project (1997) to 61,000 villages (2010). Such a large-scale project needs a 
diff erent kind of management and monitoring to be eff ective.
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Considering the capacity of the facilitators and the already long project process, adding one or two 
more meetings especially for marginalized groups would not be eff ective. Producing thousands 
of competent facilitators will take time and might not be feasible. It is also important to note 
that usually community empowerment does not operate on a large scale because of the intensive 
facilitation required. A large-scale project must have a specifi c focus and practical objectives, and 
therefore tends to be mechanical. Th erefore, we opt for redesigning the large-scale PNPM-Rural 
to focus on a single area to be more eff ective. In this case the division of PNPM into PNPM Inti 
and PNPM Penguatan (see Chapter 1) would provide the means to refocus the program. PNPM 
Inti should focus only on infrastructure, which is the strength of the program, while facilitation 
of marginalized groups and on savings and loans should be developed gradually through pilot 
activities of PNPM Penguatan. PNPM Penguatan is not a new concept. It is the “refi ned off spring” 
of PNPM that have been developed for some time, albeit quietly, to focus on a specifi c group 
or issue that requires additional input. In particular one of the off spring, PEKKA, has shown 
that strong facilitation has empowered female–headed households (as a marginalized group) 
and improved their position in the community. Th e following sections will discuss the proposed 
solutions for PNPM-Rural in more details. 
4.1 Selecting a Single Focus
Capitalize on PNPM-Rural’s strength by focusing only on community infrastructure, which 
is what PNPM-Rural has done best. Although infrastructure does not yet proportionally benefi t 
marginalized groups, and probably never will, the study found that PNPM-Rural has been able 
to provide needed public goods that marginalized groups can enjoy. In some villages, especially in 
isolated areas, PNPM-Rural has been the only program that responded to the villagers’ requests. 
Villagers’ need for small-scale infrastructure has gone unfulfi lled by other projects and from the 
government’s annual development mechanism (musrenbang) despite the need for such infrastructure 
remaining high, even in Java, which is often considered the most developed area in the country. 
Involvement (in a broader sense) of these marginalized groups is also relatively higher than in 
other loan activities, at least as laborers in the construction work. Infrastructure quality has been 
known to be generally good and signifi cantly cheaper than that built by regular contractors, as 
previous studies of KDP have shown. Providing better access through infrastructure is a trademark 
of PNPM-Rural and it is by all means no less important than providing small loans. Hence, the 
study recommends that PNPM-Rural (or PNPM Inti) only focus on providing infrastructure. 
Th e single focus would help ease the burden on facilitators and still bring signifi cant benefi ts. 
Other activities should be done selectively as PNPM Penguatan (see 4.2 and 4.3 below).
Simplify the PNPM-Rural mechanism without compromising public participation through 
plebiscites. Th e study shows that participation in PNPM-Rural is dominated by village elites and 
activists (see Chapter 2). Kecamatan and desa facilitators are not well prepared for intensive and 
skillful facilitation that would empower marginalized groups to participate in substantive matters, 
i.e. in decision-making. A large scale PNPM-Rural that covers almost all villages in the country 
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and is tied to the annual budget cycle can hardly be expected to provide the intensive facilitation 
needed to assist marginalized groups. In fact, fi nding or producing thousands of good facilitators is 
a signifi cant problem.13 In addition, many villagers confess to being exhausted by the annual project 
cycle and its numerous meetings. Also, laddering the discussions from the hamlets up to the sub-
districts did not provide more opportunities for participation. In fact, by the time the discussion 
reaches the sub-district, very often the voice of the people in the hamlets has evaporated. Th e 
program requires a much simpler mechanism. Th e study recommends that selection of village 
proposals be made through a plebiscite instead of deliberations. Th is mechanism was tried out 
in PNPM-Rural villages several years back. Th is experiment showed that selection of proposals is 
similar to those being selected by deliberations. In fact, woman proposals are more likely to be 
selected. Satisfaction is also rated higher when proposals are selected through direct votes. (Olken, 
2008)
To off set the bias of hamlets with large population, proposals should be weighted. A simple 
scoring system can be made using two criteria: population size of hamlet and distance of the 
proposed project site to village center. Proposals from hamlets with small populations weigh more 
and so do project sites that are further away from the village center.
4.2 Tending Marginalized Groups
Facilitate marginalized groups to organize and voice their needs. By defi nition marginalized 
groups lack resources, access to information, and confi dence—hence, it is this group that needs 
special support through a PNPM Penguatan to ensure that their voice is heard properly rather 
than represented by elites. Th e present study found that marginalized groups are less likely to 
participate in the PNPM-Rural process. Very few facilitators (FK and KPMD) are aware that 
they need to pay special attention to these groups or, if they are, even fewer are able to provide 
the needed facilitation. Th e present study recommends that marginalized groups have specifi c 
facilitation in order to level the playing fi eld with the majority of the villagers. However, unlike the 
other PNPM Penguatan, we recommend that there is no special grant awarded to these groups. 
Th ese groups are not intended to be exclusive or become a “special” group with its own funds that 
might alienate them from the rest of the villagers. Th e main objective of the special facilitation 
is to strengthen marginalized groups to enable them to participate more actively in decision-
making in village activities, including PNPM-Rural and SPP.  Specifi cally, to “level the playing 
fi eld”, the facilitation should aim to develop marginalized groups’ organizing capacity, negotiation 
skills, networking, and ability to access information hence enabling them to voice their needs and 
demand response. Th is kind of empowerment might need two-three or more years to develop. 
Members of the groups should be the bottom 10 percent of the village population, which will 
eliminate the better-off  and elites. For the fi rst phase, pilot activities can be done in a few districts 
that have shown some success in increasing village capacity. 
13 After the completion of the fi eldwork we understand that PNPM-Rural management is doing substantial changes, in 
particular in reducing the workload of facilitators to let them have more time for facilitation. Facilitators need only 
to provide reports to Kabupaten. Th ey do not have to train the village facilitators—professional trainers will do the 
work. Village proposals that have been verifi ed but not funded will be automatically funded in the following year. 
Other changes include training methods for facilitators that allow more refl ection and group discussions. Results of 
these changes are not yet observed. (Interview with Bito Wikantosa of PNPM-Rural Secretariat, April 29, 2010). 
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4.3 Facilitating More Sustainable Savings and Loans
Focus only where savings and loans work with specifi c facilitation. Th ere is generally no lack 
of demand for loans in the study sites, but only in a few cases are groups able to improve their 
livelihoods through the loans. Findings of the study show that in most places SPP does not work 
as expected. Groups are usually recently formed and created specifi cally for the purpose of getting 
the PNPM-Rural loans. Many members, particularly the poor who are included to meet PNPM-
Rural requirements, do not have a clear idea what kind of income-generating activities they would 
like to undertake. Often their business plans are not viable. Even if they have a good business 
concept, there is hardly any support to strengthen the group—as the borrower—and help it deal 
with problems the members face, e.g., in marketing and getting materials in bulk for lower prices, 
etc. In very few cases, SPP does work to improve the livelihoods of marginalized groups, such as 
the case in South Sulawesi where the group leader is very committed in helping poor women in 
her hamlet. In general, however, the current SPP model appears to be an “appendix” to PNPM-
Rural; providing relatively little support beyond checking balance books. Furthermore, SPP is 
not sustainable as repayment rates are still low (see Chapter 2). Clearly small credit groups under 
PNPM-Rural need specifi c facilitation, too, since the support they need as small business owners 
is very diff erent to supporting a participatory planning and development process. Obviously, 
such intensive assistance cannot be provided in a large scale. We recommend that SPP is turned 
into PNPM-Rural Penguatan, too, and given only to selected areas with a history of good 
repayment rates.
4.4 Institutional and Technical Improvements
PNPM-Rural originated from the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), a three-year project 
in the beginning of the major economic crisis in late 1990s. Although the design started before 
the crisis, adjustments were made when the crisis came. At that time the main purpose was to 
channel money quickly to villages; hence the scale up from 6 sub-districts in the pilot in 1997 to 
over 500 sub-districts in 1998. FKs were required to have a few years of experience in facilitation. 
At that time the demand for community facilitators was not anywhere near as high as it is today, 
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and KDP managed to get many experienced facilitators from non-government organizations with 
experience working at the grassroots level.  Now PNPM-Rural covers 61,000 villages in Indonesia 
in more than 4,000 sub-districts.  More than 10,000 FKs had to be recruited (half of them are 
engineers). PNPM has to accept facilitators with lower qualifi cations—many were fresh graduates 
and had no facilitation experience before. Th is is an indication of the shrinking pool of qualifi ed 
human resources that naturally aff ects PNPM-Rural’s performance. On top of it, each of these less 
qualifi ed facilitators is required to train and supervise 10-20 village facilitators. Quality suff ers.
Th e training provided focuses to a large extent on program administration rather than on facilitation 
techniques and PNPM-Rural’s ultimate objective of reaching the poor. Compounding the problem 
of limited training in facilitation, local facilitators do not receive enough supervision and feedback. 
For example, in many study sites village facilitators did not perform the social mapping properly. 
When poor and marginalized groups were identifi ed (often due to the KPMD living in the same 
village/hamlet), no specifi c eff orts were made to include them. Th ere was little or no oversight by 
Kabupaten facilitators or other program staff  to correct this. Th e program monitoring system may 
be able to identify the issue, but feedback does not seem to reach facilitators and impact the quality 
of their work.
Another major problem found in the fi eld is the delay of funds, both operational funds (from the 
local government) and block grant funds (from the central government). Th e milder impacts of late 
funds range from physical works that must slow down to loss of community spirit and enthusiasm. 
More serious impacts may include, for example, funds intended for planting that arrive after the 
planting season, and are then used for consumption. It appears that despite the project size and 
political backing, the institutional arrangements for fund fl ows are inadequate and there is no 
initiative to fi nd a solution to the problem.
Now that PNPM-Rural has expanded nationwide, it requires both institutional and technical 
adjustments to respond to the expanded scale. Below are some recommendations to improve 
the operations of PNPM-Rural, bearing in mind that the technical improvements alone will not 
signifi cantly increase the participation of marginalized groups.
 Facilitation school for facilitators. One of the most consistent fi ndings in the study was a 
lack of awareness about marginalized groups and their needs among facilitators, as well as 
the low quality of facilitation skills of the FK and KPMD—the latter is more of a result of 
weak FKs. Th e new training school that PNPM-Rural is currently developing is the right 
step to take to increase the pool of qualifi ed facilitators and improve their capacity. It is 
still too early to evaluate whether the school will actually increase the competency of the 
facilitators.
 Training and operational costs for KPMD from UPK. It is critical to have a well-trained, 
qualifi ed FK as this ensures the KPMD will receive higher quality training. Th e recent idea 
to release the FK from training the KPMD and delegate this work to professional trainers 
is positive. However, good training by itself is not enough. In the case of the KPMD, 
operational costs have become a major stumbling block for KPMD executing their duties, 
notably traveling to all of a village’s hamlets, especially to the remote and isolated areas 
where marginalized groups tend to live. Even if the work of the KPMD is intended 
to be partially volunteerism (as the wages they receive are small), it is hardly viable for 
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most KPMD to pay for gas (and few of them have motorcycles) or transportation. Th ese 
operational costs can be paid by the proceeds of the kecamatan UPK.
 Focus on key participation issues in monitoring and provide feedback. For a program 
as large as PNPM-Rural it is hardly possible to monitor everything in detail. PNPM-Rural 
should prioritize areas of focus and collect information in suffi  cient detail to 1) ensure that 
PNPM-Rural is implemented in a way that meets its goals and 2) provide a strong basis for 
future program evolution. For example, it is not enough to report how many people—men 
and women, poor and non-poor—attend a meeting, but also who speaks to infl uence the 
decision taken. Th is information would show to what extent PNPM-Rural is reaching its 
self-defi ned goal of empowerment. Further, the FK should be responsible for ensuring the 
quality of the KPMD’s work, including meeting reporting standards. Most importantly, 
the Kabupaten Facilitators should make periodic spot checks of what has been reported 
(e.g., the attendance list) by the Kecamatan Facilitators, and report the results.  Reports 
from the fi eld must receive responses; feedback sends the message that these reports matter.
 Use independent monitoring groups. Regular monitoring by the Government of 
Indonesia and the World Bank should be complemented by an independent monitoring 
group, particularly to provide a more qualitative review of the PNPM-Rural process. 
PNPM-Rural has been using provincial non-government organizations to do this work 
for quite a few years but the quality varies. PNPM-Rural should review the work and 
pick one or two of the best groups to work with a few others to improve the quality of the 
monitoring.
 Reduce delays in fund disbursements. Delays in disbursements indicate issues with 
institutional preparedness that extends well beyond the PNPM-Rural program. Th e delays 
also indicate that PNPM-Rural has always been viewed as a project rather than a program 
by the implementing agency; hence the implementing agency has never adapted to 
provide consistent, long-term support. As delays have aff ected the quality of PNPM-Rural 
implementation signifi cantly, serious eff orts have to be made to minimize these problems.
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